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Professor  Coenen  has  given  us  an  extraordinarily  valuable
examination of subconstitutional doctrines that allow the Supreme
Court to influence legislative choice without dictating it.' Professor
Coenen presents  subconstitutional  doctrines  as  supplements to
the  forms  of  judicial  review  that  dominate  theorizing  about
constitutional  law.  Those  dominating  forms, which  I  call  sub-
stantivejudicial review, involve the displacement of legislative and
executive choice by the courts' specification of constitutional norms.
In  contrast,  the  subconstitutional  doctrines  Professor  Coenen
describes  and commends  allow the political branches  to pursue
their preferred policies, if only they do so in the proper way. But,
according  to  Professor  Coenen,  subconstitutional  doctrines  still
leave open the possibility of substantive judicial review.
In this  brief  Comment  I  make  two  points.2  First,  the  sub-
constitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing
elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as
they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines.
In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation
based  on  subconstitutional  law  turns  out  to  be-and, indeed,
might  be  expected  at  the  moment  of  decision  to be-a  final,
unrevisable  decision.3 Further, courts might strategically deploy
*  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1.  See DanT. Coenen,A Constitution  of Collaboration:  Protecting  Fundamental  Values
with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch  Dialogue, 42 Wm. &  MARY L. REv.  1575 (2001). I
understand Professor Coenen's reasons for using the term structural  to describe the rules he
discusses. See id. at 1583-94,1596-1603.  I prefer the term subconstitutional  nonetheless, in
part because it avoids the kinds of confusions that Professor Coenen is careful to dispel in
his article.
2.  Professor Coenen mentions these problems near the conclusion ofhis comprehensive
article but does not explore them in detail. See id. at 1845-51.
3.  I note that some ofthe doctrines Professor Coenen discusses-the doctrines dealing
with no-longer-advanced justifications, desuetude, and changed-facts-mightbe defended on
the  ground that they perform the  function of cleansing  the  statute books  of laws  that
legislatures  today would not enact but have not yet repealed. This may be  because the
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these subconstitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge
that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so.
Second, one might fairly question the need for conclusive judicial
review in the classic mode precisely because these doctrines are so
widely available.  Normatively, a combination  of full democratic
choice coupled with subconstitutional doctrines to ensure that such
choice is informed, carefully made,  and the like, might be more
attractive than a system  in which  democratic  choice  is limited
substantively  by  the  courts.  Exactly  what  extra  value  does
democratic  self-governance  get from  conclusive judicial  review?
Pretty clearly, not  all that much, in light of the scope  of these
subconstitutional doctrines.
These two points are obviously in some tension with each other,
and I do not wish to urge that one or the other is correct. Rather, I
suggest  that  developing  a  more  complete  understanding  of
subconstitutional  doctrines will require us to grapple with these
and other  objections that Professor  Coenen  mentions largely in
passing. Professor Coenen's survey of subconstitutional law is so
comprehensive  that I can hope to use only selected examples  to
support  these  two  observations.  I  believe,  though,  that  my
observations can be extended beyond the particular examples I use.
I. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AS SHAM?
The deep structure, so to speak, of subconstitutional rules is this:
The Court says to a legislature, "You tried to accomplish  goal X
through means A. But, you can't do that. We're not saying that you
are precluded in principle from accomplishing goal X. Rather, you
can  accomplish  goal X,  but only  by using means  B  or C." The
problem with this approach  is that means  A  may  be the only
politically feasible method  of accomplishing  goal  X.  The  Court
effectively  forecloses  the  accomplishment  of the  goal  it says  is
available in principle, by foreclosing the  only politically feasible
method. And,  notably, it  does  so without having to  defend the
legislatures have more important things to do or, more interestingly, because the outdated
statutes still have enough supporters to make repeal politically risky. Ithink this a valuable
function, but it pretty clearly  does not raise the kinds  of questions  of democratic self-
governance that more robust forms of  judicial review do.
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proposition that the Constitution properly interpreted really does
foreclose the legislature from accomplishing goal X.4
An  example  from  Canada  provides  a  useful  illustration.
Morgentaler  v. The Queen, Canada's abortion case, invalidated that
nation's regulation of abortion.5  It  did so on what appears in  the
first instance to be structural or subconstitutional grounds. The
statute making it  a crime to obtain  or perform an abortion also
provided  a  defense.  Putting  it  roughly,  doctors  would  escape
criminal  liability  if  they  showed  that  they  had  obtained  the
permission of a hospital committee finding the abortion medically
appropriate.  But, the Canadian  Supreme  Court  said,  the facts
showed that this defense was  actually illusory because hospital
committees  were  unable  to  give  their  permission  in  a  timely
manner. It would seem, then, that the Canadian Parliament could
continue  to  criminalize  abortion  by developing  a  better system
through  which  someone would  give  the doctors  the permission
necessary to immunize them from criminal liability. 6 Things turned
out otherwise.  Afraid to take  a position on what was clearly a
divisive political issue, the government allowed a vote on a revision
of the  abortion  law,  but  made  it  a  "free"-that is,  nonparty
line-vote.7  Parliamentary  maneuvering  produced  a  legislative
stalemate, and the law criminaliz ing abortion went unrevised. That
law was, of course, unenforceable after the Morgentaler  decision. A
purportedly procedural ruling had conclusive substantive effect.
The Morgentaler  model can be generalized. A statute results from
the confluence  of political forces  at the time of enactment. Some
other statute would  have been enacted if those forces had been
different. Provisionally invalidating a statute may have conclusive
effect when those political forces remain unchanged, because the
statute  actually enacted may have been the only one that could
have emerged from the political process. And, I should emphasize,
this may be true even if all participants in the legislative process
gave  as  complete  consideration  of  the  lurking  constitutional
4. Professor Coenen notes this concern. See id. at 1850.
5.  [19881  1 S.C.R. 30.
6. Or, presumably, to eliminate the defense entirely.
7.  For adescriptionofthepost-Morgenthalerlegislative  activity, see F.L. MORTON, PRO-
CHOICE V.  PRO-LIFE: ABORTONAND  THE COuRTs IN  CANADA 290-93  (1992).
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questions as the subconstitutional doctrines demand. It is not that
the legislature  failed to consider  relevant constitutional  issues.
Perhaps each legislator fully considered those issues. Then, when
the legislators'  diverse views were  aggregated in the process  of
enacting legislation, the result was a statute that did not-because
it  could  not-reflect  on  its  face  any  specific  position  on  the
constitutional issues.'
The foregoing conclusion should be qualified. First, the contours
of the political terrain may have changed. In particular, proponents
of the policy in question may have gained enough power that they
can now do something they could not do earlier: enact a statute that
complies  with the  Court's  subconstitutional  demands.  Some  of
Professor Coenen's time-linked subconstitutional rules make sense
precisely because,  as he notes, they provide  a chance for a new
political  coalition to  determine whether, and to what extent, it
wishes  to pursue a policy  adopted by a prior coalition. The new
coalition might in principle want  to eliminate the old coalition's
policy, but the new coalition might have higher priorities. Judicial
invalidation pursuant  to a subconstitutional  rule gives  the new
coalition  what  it  needs  without  having  to  affront  the  old  one
directly. In this setting the courts act as political allies of a new
political coalition, accomplishing part of the new coalition's agenda
without  taking up the legislature's  limited time.  One could,  of
course,  wonder  whether  courts  serving  this  function  are
demonstrating the kind of independence of politics that we usually
associate with rule-of-law ideals.9
Second, the Court's decision may give new information to the
contending parties, and that information may have some impact on
the  political  balance.  Political  forces  contend  over  the  precise
location  of an outcome  in what  political scientists  call  a policy
8.  I emphasize that my argument combines a perspective drawn from political science
with the normative concerns of traditional constitutional theory, and that,  given my training
as a lawyer, I think it would be profitable for political scientists to weigh in on the matters
about which they are more knowledgeable than I.
9.  A  survey  identifying  the  actual  time  lags  between  enactment  (or reasoned
reconsideration, as Judge Calabresi suggested in his opinion in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,
735, 738-43  (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring)) and the judicial invocation of these
time-linked rules would  be quite useful  as a basis  for assessing the contribution  these
techniques make to the constitutional order.
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space.' °  Sometimes  the  outcome  results not  so  much  from the
balance of political forces but from contingent facts: agenda control
by one or another actor, the press of time as a legislative session
ends and opportunities for amendment and compromise disappear,
and the like. Many outcomes in the policy space would be politically
acceptable to the contending forces. The Court's new decision may
shift the result from one point within the policy space of potential
outcomes to another.
The doctrines  dealing with the "who" of decision making that
Professor  Coenen  identifies  may have  this  effect. 1  Consider  a
President who would like to make policy on some matter, but who
faces  resistance  from  Congress.  The  President  can  overcome
resistance by yielding on some other matter of less importance to
him or her. The President's bargaining position is strengthened by
a subconstitutional doctrine saying that the President is the only
decision maker the Constitution permits. Notably, however, these
subconstitutional doctrines do not mean that the President (or other
decision maker identified by the doctrines) necessarily prevails. A
President who moves too far outside what Congress is willing to
accept will be confronted  with retaliation in  some other area of
presidential concern.'  Again, the subconstitutional doctrines shift
the outcome from one point within the policy space defined by the
balance of political forces to another, but rarely will they shift the
outcome to a point outside that policy space.
With these possibilities in  mind, we should also  consider that
sometimes  the  Court  may want  to  foreclose  the  possibility  of
legislation without openly defending -that  desire. The Justices may
calculate that barring the legislature from using the means it has
chosen will have the effect of making further action impossible, as
in  the Morgentaler situation. The idea here is that the Justices
10.  See CHARLES  M. CAMETON,  VETO  BARGAINING:  PRE  IDENTS  AND  THE POLITICS  OF
NEGATM POWER 86 (2000).
11.  See Coenen, supra  note 1, at 1773-1805.
12.  The well-documented  persistence of effective legislative vetoes even after INS v.
Chadha,  462 U.S. 919 (1983), is an example of the role that political forces continue to play
even after the Court identifies a constitutionally mandated decision maker. Fora discussion
of the persistence  of legislative vetoes or their functional equivalent after Chadha, see
JESSIcA KOEN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONALISM  AND THE MYTH
OF THE LEGISLATV  VETO (1996).
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engage in  a certain kind of political prediction on two levels:  one
about the public acceptability of a  substantive decision,  and one
about  the  possibility  of  legislative  enactment  of  the  same
substantive policy, but in a different form. A strategic Court would
invoke subconstitutional doctrines after calculating that the risk of
public rejection of a substantive decision is too high and that the
legislature will be unable to reenact the statute in the form that the
subconstitutional doctrine suggests would be constitutional.
As Professor Coenen notes, such calculations, if they occur, may
be mistaken. The Court developed clear-statement rules to protect
states from monetary liability under federal statutes." 3  It turned
out that the beneficiaries  of Congress's  first efforts had enough
power to get Congress to reenact the statutes with sufficiently clear
statements.  The  Court  then  imposed  the  substantive  limits
anyway.
14
The state immunity cases suggest a broader concern. Sometimes
invoking  subconstitutional  rules  is  a  sham,  when  the  Court
correctly calculates that those rules eliminate the only political
feasible method of reaching the legislature's desired goal. And it is
unclear what the subconstitutional rules contribute if, in the end,
the  Court  must  confront  the  underlying  substantive  question
anyway.  15
II. SUBCONSTiTUTIONAL  REVIEW AS SuBsTITuTE?
Professor Coenen's catalogue of subconstitutional doctrines is so
comprehensive  that  I  am  left  wondering,  what role is  left  for
substantive constitutional review?  Suppose that courts sincerely
deploy  these  subconstitutional  doctrines,  structuring  decision
making by the political branches in a way that ensures reasonably
13.  See Coenen, supra  note 1, at 1624-26 (discussingAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985)).
14.  See id. at 1626. Notably, the substantive decisions have been far more controversial,
at least among commentators, than the clear-statement decisions. That is, the Court's first-
level  political calculation,  about public acceptability,  appears to have  been correct  even
though its second-level one was not.
15.  I note, for example, that Professor Coenen wonders whether the subconstitutional
rules developed in the current Court's early state immunity cases should survive now that
the Court has imposed a substantive limitation on Congress's power. See id. at 1627-29.
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full consideration of constitutionally sensitive issues. Why should
the courts play any other role?
I am less skeptical than many others of the political branches'
ability to deal reasonably with constitutional issues. 6  The Court's
subconstitutional doctrines, if anything, are likely to improve the
political branches' performance. We should consider the possibility
that these doctrines improve the political branches' performance so
much that the need for substantive review will disappear. One need
not be a Pollyanna about this possibility. The political branches will
never  be  perfect  constitutional  decision  makers,  under  any
particular criterion of goodness. But, then, neither will the Court,
unless  the  criterion  of  constitutional  goodness  is  the  purely
positivist  one that says,  "The Constitution is what the Supreme
Court says it is." Both the Court and the political branches, that is,
will make constitutional errors according to any specified criterion.
It could be that the subconstitutional doctrines, properly deployed," 7
reduce the number and significance of the political branches' errors
to the point where  they are less important than the  errors the
courts commit.
Professor Coenen  notes  this argument,  albeit in  a  somewhat
sidewise manner. He defends the invocation of subconstitutional
doctrines on the ground that they "reflect a wise and deeply rooted
commitment  to  judicial  restraint" while  "leav[ing]  courts  with
significant powers," particularly traditional substantive review.'8
Professor Coenen's defense of subconstitutional doctrines suggests
the form he would give in  a direct response to the question of the
need for substantive judicial review. As I read his final section,
Professor  Coenen finds the normative justification for doctrine,
whether it  be  subconstitutional  doctrine  or substantive judicial
review, in  long-standing  practice  supported  by "text, tradition,
history, and precedent." 9
16.  See Mark Tushnet, Congressional  Constitutional  Interpretation:  Some Criteria  and
Two Informal Case Studies, DuKE L. J. (forthcoming 2001).
17.  That is, taking into account the possibility that the Court will make a mistake in
invoking one of  the subconstitutional doctrines, just as it can make mistakes in substantive
review.
18.  Coenen, supra  note 1, at 1834-35.
19.  Id. at 1851.
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Notably absent from this  is an obvious  additional  candidate:
normative democratic theory. The reason for that absence is clear
enough to me. Reconciling substantive constitutional review with
normative democratic theory has proved enormously difficult. As far
as  I  can tell,  all  efforts  at  reconciliation  founder  on a  single
problem. There are uncontroversial constitutional norms such as
"protect free speech" and "treat everyone  with equal dignity and
respect." Difficulty  arises when we try to figure  out what those
abstract and uncontroversial norms mean in any particular setting,
that  is,  when we  try to determine  whether  a  specific  statute
contravenes the norms. Reasonable people can reasonably disagree
on particular applications  even while they agree on the abstract
norms. Typically, substantive judicial review is defended  on the
ground that courts have institutional  characteristics  that make
them more likely than the political branches to select a specification
of the abstract norm that lies within the range of reasonableness.
That defense seems to me quite hard to make out once we have, as
I believe we should have, an appropriately expansive sense of what
the range of reasonable specifications of the abstract norms is. 0
Skeptics might respond by identifying a Supreme Court decision,
decided  on  substantive  grounds,  that  is  unequivocally  right
according to some criterion. Candidates might be Brown v. Board
of Education 2' or Texas v. Johnson. 22 The general form of my reply
to  the  skeptic  would  be  to identify  potential  subconstitutional
doctrines that Inight have been invoked to avoid the substantive
decision while  offering the political  branches the opportunity to
reconsider  their  commitment  to  the  questioned  statutes.  The
skeptic might reply that the candidate cases are good ones to test
my claim because they are cases where the nearly certain response
from the political branches would have been the readoption of the
statutes. I think that this reply is a good one for Texas v. Johnson.'
20. Formyelaborationofthis argument, see MARKTUsHNET, TAKINGTHE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE CouRTs (1999). See also FRANKL  MICHEUmAN,  BRENNAN  AND DEMOCRACY,
ch. 1 (1999).
21.  347 U.S.  483, 495 (1954) (holding school segregation unconstitutional).
22.  491 U.S.  397, 420  (1989)  (finding unconstitutional  a statute that prohibited flag
desecration).
23.  I emphasize again that identifying one  or more legislative errors corrected by the
courts through substantive judicial review is insufficient to establishthe overall value of  such
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I wonder, though, whether there might not be subconstitutional
doctrines that would have allowed the Court inBrown  to insist that
imposing a policy of segregation had to be done on the national level
(a  "who decides" kind of subconstitutional  doctrine, in Professor
Coenen's terms), pursuant to a clearer statement than existed in
any  statute  on the books  in  1954. That  would have forced  the
proponents of segregation to take the initiative in Congress, and my
guess is that they would have been unable to obtain enough support
there to enact segregation policies even though they had enough
power to block the enactment of antisegregation ones.
Subconstitutional  doctrines, however, need not be inconsistent
with  normative  democratic  theory if  they do  not  foreclose  any
substantive legislative choice. They clearly do not do so in  theory,
for their entire point is to ensure full consideration of constitutional
norms by the political branches without dictating the content  of
those  branches'  conclusions.'  Professor  Coenen  might  have
strengthened the case for subconstitutional doctrines by invoking
normative democratic theory.'  In doing so, though, he would have
been less able to defend subconstitutional  review on the ground
that,  after  all is  said and  done,  it  preserves  the possibility  of
substantive judicial review. But, it is unclear to me why one should
regard that loss as a matter of regret.
CONCLUSION
As  Professor  Coenen  shows,  scholars  have  noticed the exis-
tence of subconstitutional  doctrines  before, and  some have even
tried to generalize them into a theory of structural due process.
Professor  Coenen's  signal  contribution  is  to  demonstrate  that
subconstitutional  doctrines  are  more  common  than  even  prior
review. Afull assessmentmust also consider errors the courts themselves make in exercising
substantive judicial review, and determine whether the judicial errors are less important
overall than the errors made by the political branches. And, of course, all this depends on
there being some agreement among the discussants on what the criterion for identifying
errors is.
24.  As discussed earlier, subconstitutional doctrines may foreclose substantive choices
in practice. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
25.  See TUSMEr, supra  note 20, at 163-65, for a brief discussion of this point. Were I to
write that passage again, I would certainly cite Professor Coenen's work.
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scholars have thought, and indeed that such doctrines pervade the
Supreme Court's work. In doing  so, Professor  Coenen  makes  it
possible to ask what these doctrines actually do, and whether they
are  so  pervasive  that  we  could  get  along  quite  well  with
subconstitutional  doctrine  and  no  substantive  judicial  review.
Professor Coenen's important article  does what good scholarship
should:  open  up  paths  for  further  exploration.  Perhaps  this
Comment  shows  that some  of those  paths might lead to  quite
unexpected destinations. So much the better for his article.